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ORIGIN AND IMPACT OF
GOVERNMENT
REGULATIONS
CHARLES M. WHELAN, S.J.
Since our first meeting in 1965, we have been concerned with a great
variety of legal issues. This is the first year, however, in which events have
forced us to reconsider one of the most fundamental aspects of the relation-
ship between the Church and the federal and state governments: the right
of the civil government to impose its laws, enacted for the public peace,
health, safety, morals, and prosperity on the agencies and institutions
through which the Church carries on the redemptive mission of Christ.
In the past we have been concerned, for the most part, with affirma-
tive action that we wanted the government to take-notably, financial
assistance for the secular educational component in our elementary and
secondary schools. Now we are very much concerned with actions that we
do not want the government to take-notably, treating our schools (for tax
and labor management purposes) as if they were exactly the same as non-
religious educational institutions. There is both horror and irony in the fact
that the arguments we advanced to justify public financial assistance to
our schools are now being used, at least by some agencies of the federal
government, to justify much greater public supervision and regulation of
those schools.
The Seventh Circuit has even suggested that the government is
"cruelly whipsawing" us-by holding that our schools are too religious for
financial assistance, and not religious enough to escape governmental regu-
lation. Only ten years after we won the great textbook victory in the Allen
case of 1968, by emphasizing the substantial public and secular functions
of our schools, we find ourselves now insisting that the schools are too
religious to be required to file annual financial reports or to be subjected
to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
There is no necessary contradiction in this change of emphasis. But,
speaking for myself, I feel more than a little embarrassment and a great
deal of unease-a sense that we are indeed in dangerous waters and that
we must chart our course with extreme care. It is time for us to go back to
fundamentals: to reexamine the criteria that Church lawyers should use
in accepting or opposing governmental regulation of Church affairs. Only
by such reexamination can we hope to avoid foundering on the fallacies of
the moment. Surely we ought to think twice before picking up weap-
ons-like Pfeffer's "profile" of the religious characteristics of our
schools-that the Supreme Court has used to clobber us.
As a small contribution to this reexamination of fundamental princi-
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ples, I suggest that it is essential for us to keep in mind the distinctions
between three different kinds of objections that Church attorneys may
interpose to an expansion of governmental regulation of Church affairs.
The first type of objection is the "Church" objection; the second is the
''constitutional" objection; and the third is the "public policy" objection.
The "Church" Objection:
The "Church" objection is the most fundamental of the three types.
It is also the rarest, at least in this country. It is based not on the Constitu-
tion or on ordinary considerations of public policy, but on the mission that
Christ has given to the Church. The Church can never accept laws that
make it impossible for the Church to preach the Gospel or administer the
sacraments. Given such laws, the only possible response of the Church is
the response of Peter and the apostles to the Sanhedrin when they were
forbidden to preach in the name of Jesus: "Obedience to God comes before
obedience to men." (Acts 5:29). And if legal punishment comes to the
Church for disobedience to such laws, the Church, like Peter and the
apostles when flogged by order of the Sanhedrin, is "glad to have had the
honor of suffering humiliation" for the sake of Jesus Christ.
At the close of the Second Vatican Council, Pope Paul VI and the
other Fathers of the Council sent a message to the temporal rulers of this
world. After proclaiming publicly that the Church honors the authority
and sovereignty of these rulers, respects their office, and recognizes their
just laws, the message goes on to say:
And what does this Church ask of you after close to two thousand years of
experiences of all kinds in her relations with you, the powers of the earth?
What does the Church ask of you today? She tells you in one of the major
documents of this Council. She asks of you only liberty, the liberty to believe
and preach her faith, the freedom to love her God and serve him, the freedom
to live and to bring to men her message of life. (The Documents of Vatican
11 [ed. Abbott-Gallagher; 1966] p. 730).
This call of the Second Vatican Council for legal freedom to carry on
the redemptive mission of Christ is not a call for exemption from every
regulatory law that civil society adopts. As many other conciliar and papal
documents demonstrate, the Church recognizes the right and duty of civil
governments to regulate temporal affairs. Accordingly, the Church has
always accepted and supported laws designed to promote the public peace,
health, safety, morals, and prosperity. Such laws may indirectly render the
Church's work more complicated or more expensive; but the only law to
which the Church objects precisely as the Church is a law that denies the
Church the basic right to preach the Gospel and administer the sacra-
ments. The Church proclaims that its members are citizens of two worlds,
bound by the laws of both. Christ came to save us, not to exempt us.
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The Constitutional Objection:
As lawyers, we have the task of translating the Church's divine claim
to freedom for its redemptive mission into constitutional, statutory, com-
mon, and administrative law. We also have the task of maximizing practi-
cal freedom for the Church by utilizing existing rules of law and advocating
new rules. This task is obviously difficult and complicated, and it is inevi-
table that there will be differences of opinion among us from time to time
about whether it is better to use an existing rule of law or seek to change
it. As Archbishop Jean Jadot, the Apostolic Delegate, reminded us in his
address to this Association three years ago:
There will be times when the complexities of the problems you face will leave
you uncertain of the best course to follow. In such circumstances, the Council
urges you "to enlighten one another through honest discussion, preserving
mutual charity and caring, above all, for the common good." (Proceedings
of the Eleventh National Meeting of Diocesan Attorneys, May 1975, pp. 4-
5).
These remarks of Archbishop Jadot are particularly pertinent to the
problems we face in selecting constitutional principles to urge before the
Supreme Court. I will give just one pressing example: the use of the argu-
ment based on excessive entanglement. In my opinion, it would be a great
mistake for us to embed this argument any deeper than it already is in the
wall of separation between church and state.
As a matter of semantics, of course, "excessive entanglement" defines
itself as unconstitutional. Anything is wrong in excess. But because the
principle of excessive entanglement is relatively new in our constitutional
law and has been used by the Supreme Court to frustrate sound develop-
ments in state educational policy, I think we should be skeptical about the
utility of developing new applications of the principle. The tendency of the
principle is to isolate the Church from close contact with governmental
agencies and political processes. But such contact is essential if the Church
is to be really free to carry on the redemptive work of Christ. The Church
transcends the world, but the Church is very much in the world. If a
particular law or regulation interferes directly with the teaching or worship
of the Church, it would be better, in my opinion, to argue that such inter-
ference is directly proscribed by the free exercise clause than to argue that
there has been an "excessive entanglement" of church and state.
It is in the nature of constitutional principles that they can be changed
only by the agreement of three-fourths of the states or five justices of the
Supreme Court. When we select constitutional principles in our work be-
fore the courts and the legislatures, we ought to be reasonably sure that
the principles will serve us well over the long run. The Church has always
believed in a great deal of contact and collaboration between the secular
and spiritual powers. The Church, moreover, has no objection in principle
to reasonable regulation of its temporal affairs by the civil government.
Such regulation is objectionable only when it actually interferes with the
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preaching of the Gospel or the administration of the sacraments. In my
opinion, therefore, it would be a mistake for us to promote the development
of a constitutional principle that governmental regulation of the temporal
affairs of the Church is, or creates an unconstitutional danger of, excessive
entanglement between church and state.
The Public Policy Objection:
As citizens of two worlds, we must share responsibility for the tem-
poral as well as the spiritual welfare of our fellow men. Accordingly, we
should never forget that we are not limited to theological or constitutional
considerations in appraising the acceptability of various laws or proposals
for new laws. We are both free and obliged to use all of the ordinary
arguments employed in the shaping of public policy. I sometimes suspect
that we would make more progress if we relied less on the Constitution and
more on common sense and widely held conceptions of the general welfare.
Public policy arguments, of course, are generally addressed to legisla-
tures and regulatory bodies rather than to the courts. But a great deal of
our work today is in the legislatures and -the regulatory bodies; and we
know that the courts themselves-and especially the Supreme Court-are
not insensitive to arguments based on public policy. If we- have a good
reason for wanting to be exempt from a particular law of general applica-
tion, we ought to develop that reason as consistent with the public policy
of the particular law in question or as consistent with other, overriding
considerations of public policy.
Inevitably, there will be many differences of opinion among us, as well
as in the nation at large, over what is and is not desirable or important
public policy. It is essential, however, for us as Catholic lawyers to engage
in this debate. Our Faith and our Constitution do not answer most of the
practical questions with which we are confronted. As citizens of two worlds,
we have a duty to both God and Caesar to use our intelligence, our energy,
and our talents to improve the temporal and spiritual well-being of the
Church and of all our fellow men.
